Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Categories', 'fragments/reports' and 'What Does It Take to Refer?'

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68 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach]
If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach]
We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach]
It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach]
Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach]
Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach]
'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach]
What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach]
Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]